Structural models and structural change: analytical principles and methodological issues

Structural analysis is the main topic of this paper and structural change is a dominant theme of the present work. The analysis of structural models and of theories of structural changes carried out in this paper has a double meaning. On the one hand, it allows to pick up several essential principles that characterize these models, on the other hand, it should allow us to reconsider some important methodological issues under a new light, such as different methods of decomposition of the productive systems, the problem of complexity and the strategies to reduce complexity. Moreover, the paper tries to compare Quesnay’s Tableau, taken as a benchmark model, with Leontief’s, von Neumann’s and Sraffa’s models to pick up the different features of these models with respect to his theoretical framework and also to identify their characteristics for structural analysis and structural change.

Economics and psychology.Perfect rationality versus bounded rationality

Classical mathematical algorithms often fail to identify in time when the international financial crises occur although, as the classical theory of choice would suggest, the economic agents are rational and the markets are or should be efficient and behave also rationally. This contribution does not pretend to give a complete answer to these questions, but it will highlight some well-known limits of the classical theory of rational choice and compare this theory of choice with the approach that seeks to combine economics and psychology and that has established itself as cognitive or behavioral economics. In particular, the present paper will focus on the juxtaposition of the concepts of perfect rationality and bounded rationality. It concludes with some references to the literature of behavioral finance which has given important contributions in explaining the behavior and the anomalies of financial markets.Bounded rationality; procedural rationality; rational choice; cognitive economics

A new governance for the EMU and the economic policy framework

The EMU governance has showed to be incapable of an effective crisis management following the global downturn. The recent decisions by European Council taken in March 2011, named the ‘Pact of the Euro’, to design a new governance of the EMU can be considered a significant attempt to give new and effective national budgetary rules, crisis management and resolution principles and procedures, economic policy framework to the Member States of the euro area, although several questions remain open. The present work seeks to investigate the causes of the crisis of the euro area and review the debate about the future of the EMU. Moreover this contribution evaluates critically the new governance of the EMU and the economic policy framework established by the Pact of the Euro underlying the need of adequate institutions, greater cooperative attitude and political coherence.EMU, Global crisis, European integration, Pact of the Euro

Knowledge, learning, networks and performance of firms in knowledge-based economies

The paper examines the issue of knowledge as a public good, and, therefore, the question of open knowledge. Moreover, it analyses the crucial relationship between knowledge and learning and, more specifically, the relationship between technological knowledge, learning and the environment. Thus the construct of absorptive capacity is investigated and the related dynamic capability approach is also considered. Finally, the paper looks at the networks and investigate the rationale of networking. Therefore, in this context, the paper discusses the issue of competition/collaboration duality, since alliance is also a complex phenomenon, where collaborative behaviours and competitive relations coexist; a more eclectic view is, thus, offered on this issue with the aim to provide a new theoretical framework of inter-firm relations.Firms; Knowledge; Learning; Networks

A new governance for the EMU and the economic policy framework

The severe crisis that affected the European Monetary Union has emphasized the prevailing interests of national governments and a lack of political leadership of the European institution , while the governance of the euro area has been incapable of an effective crisis management. The present work argues that the decisions taken in March 2011 by the European Council, named the ‘Pact for the Euro’, to design a new governance of the EMU, can be considered a fairly significant step for the European institutions in terms of credibility and legitimacy. This contribution, evaluating the economic policy framework set by the Pact for the Euro, underlines the need for appropriate institutions and a stronger attitude to cooperate among the Member States. It also stresses the need for transparency and a non ambiguous solution of the debt crisis. The major message of this work is that Economic and Monetary Union must equip itself with appropriate policy tools to manage and resolve the crisis, creating the condition to improve the competitiveness of the peripheral countries of the euro area and fostering growth. But, at the same time, Member States of the euro area and European institutions must demonstrate greater accountability and political coherence.EMU; European integration; crisis management; Pact for the euro

A coopetitive model for the green economy

The paper proposes a coopetitive model for the Green Economy. It addresses the issue of the climate change policy and the creation and diffusion of low-carbon technologies. In the present paper the complex construct of coopetiton is applied at macroeconomic level. The model, based on Game Theory, enables us to offer a set of possible solutions in a coopetitive context, allowing to find a Pareto solution in a win-win scenario. The model, which is based on the assumption that each country produces a level of output which is determined in a non-cooperative game of Cournot-type and that considers at the same time a coopetitive strategy regarding the low carbon technologies, will suggest a solution that shows the convenience for each country to participate actively to a program of low carbon technologies within a coopetitive framework to address a policy of climate change, thus aiming at balancing the environmental imbalances.coopetition; game theory; green economy; energy-saving technologies; policy of climate change

Crisis in the Euro area: coopetitive game solutions as new policy tools

The crisis within the Euro area have become frequent during 2010. First was the Greek economy to face a default problem of its sovreign debt, in November it was Ireland who has been in a serious financial situation at the verge of collapse causing difficulties to the euro. In this contribution we focus on the Greek crisis and we suggest, through a model of coopetition based on game theory and conceived at a macro level, feasible solutions in a cooperative perspective for the divergent interests which drive the economic policies in Germany and Greece, with the aim of improving the position of Greece, Germany and the whole Euro area and also giving a contribution to expand the set of macroeconomic policy tools. By means of our general analytical framework of coopetition, we show the strategies that could bring to feasible solutions in a cooperative perspective for Germany and Greece, where these feasible solutions aim at offering a win-win outcome for both countries, letting them to share the pie fairly within a growth path represented by a non-zero sum game. A remarkable analytical result of our work consists in the determination of the win-win solution by a new selection method on the transferable utility Pareto boundary of the coopetitive game.European monetary Union, Coopetitive Games, Macroeconomic Policy

Rationality and choices in economics: behavioral and evolutionary approaches

The paper critically discusses the issue of rationality and choices in economics in both the behavioural and evolutionary approaches. Our study aims, on the one hand, to highlight the scientific contributions of psychology in economics, since psychology, and with it the theoretical approach of the behavioral economics, has made more complex and problematic the analysis of economic choices, showing the limits of rationality. On the other hand, the work offers a reinterpretation of the theory of Alfred Marshall in a biologicalevolutionary perspective. The reinterpretation of Marshall's theory in a evolutionary perspective aims to show that, historically, economics has not been a discipline aligned in a homogenous way to a single and undifferentiated thought, locked into the idea of perfect rationality, but, on the opposite, is a discipline that has enriched itself and continually is enriching by contributions and significant contaminations with other research fields.rationality; choices; behavioral economics; evolutionary theories; biology;

Towards digital globalization and the covid-19 challenge

Digital globalization is a new form of globalization. It brings about relevant changes regarding how business is conducted across borders, the flow of economic benefits, and broadening participation. The growth of data and information related to digital globalization determines that global economic, financial, and social connections increase through digital platforms. Covid-19 is causing a shock to the global economy that is proving to be both faster and more severe than the 2008 global financial crisis. If the current crisis is pushing towards deglobalization, at the same time, Covid-19 represents a challenge for digital globalization and the digital transformation of economies. This research contribution examines the process towards digital globalization that is characterizing the world economy, its impact on businesses, consumers, and governments. It also discusses the challenge that the crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic is posing to the globalization and digital transformation of economies

Global green economy and environmental sustainability: a coopetitive model

This paper provides a coopetitive model for a global green economy taking into account the environmental sustainability. In particular we propose a differentiable coopetitive game G (in the sense recently introduced by D. Carfì) to represent a basic green economy interaction among a country c and the rest of the world w. Our game G is a linear parametric (Euclidean) perturbation of the classic Cournot duopoly. In the paper we offer the complete study of the proposed model and in particular a deep examination of its possible coopetitive solutions.environmental sustainability; global green economy; coopetitive games; infinite game